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Abstract
This paper contributes empirically to the long-debated issue of the legitimacy of
the European Central Bank (ECB) with regard to European polities. Using micro-
level data from the Eurobarometer survey, we shed light on the socio-demographic
determinants of public-opinion support for the ECB. We find that people with higher
level of education and income and centre to right-wing political orientation tend to
support the ECB, as well as people with optimistic expectations on the economic
situation. By contrast, the unemployed tend to distrust the ECB. The policy relev-
ance of such results is important for ECB’s communication strategy with the general
public.
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1 Introduction
Price stability has been the main goal of central banks since the high-inflation experi-
ence known even in developed economies in the 1970s and up until the recent global
financial crisis. Accordingly, monetary authorities across the world have been granted a
considerable degree of – mostly, operational – independence (Crowe and Meade, 2007;
Arnone et al., 2009; Carlstrom and Fuerst, 2009). More precisely, many governments
have chosen to delegate monetary policy and/or commit to inflation targets in order to
increase policy credibility and arrive at a lower rate of average inflation.
However, there is an inherent risk in delegating monetary policy and, for the del-
egation to be sustainable, one needs to ensure at least the medium-and-long run com-
patibility of monetary policy with the society’s preferences. This is all the more obvious
and important right now, when the global financial crisis and the Euro-area debt sus-
tainability problems have undermined the policies and reputation of perhaps the most
independent central bank in the world, the European Central Bank (ECB). Under cir-
cumstances like those the independence of monetary authorities is being confronted
with doubts and criticism from politicians.1 Such attacks on the technocratic autonomy
of central banks could be seriously threatening or impairing the effectiveness of their
present and future policies, as well as their anchoring role regarding market inflation
expectations. In particular for a supranational institution as the ECB, whose powers are
only limited by the Treaty of Maastricht and not by any given national government or
parliament, its legitimacy is at stake.
Of course, these considerations rely on the incentives of politicians to bash the cent-
ral bank and to exercise pressures on it. Hence, the larger the support from the pop-
ulation, the lower the risk for the central bank to be threatened. Public support is
particularly relevant and pressing for a young institution such as the European Central
Bank, the more so in the wake of the deepest depression for nearly a century. It still
stands accused of a lack of accountability – and, consequently, of misaligned interests
and policies with respect to national governments and electorates, especially during the
financial and Euro-debt crisis. In a nutshell, if people trust the ECB, although such sup-
port would be most likely sensitive to the business cycle (Stevenson and Wolfers, 2011),
then its legitimacy as an institution and the credibility of its monetary policy will be
higher; in addition, the attraction of the Euro as a world currency, and/or of the Euro-
area for candidate countries will be stronger too. It can furthermore be argued that
trust in the ECB and support for its policy could be enhanced by active communication
with the European polities explaining its objectives, constraints, instruments and effects.
Communication by central banks is gaining increasing importance in policymaking. A
clear and transparent communication strategy is essential if the population’s support for
a central bank’s policy declines, as it seems to be the case in the recent years, and not
just in Europe. But, as Blinder et al. (2008) show, there still exists large variation in
communication strategies across central banks, and no consensus has shaped out either
on an optimal communication strategy or on an optimal degree of transparency.
In the case of the European Central Bank which we explore here, though some pa-
pers have attempted to check how its communication is received by the markets, very
few have been able to ascertain the width of the support for the ECB in the European
1On the anecdotal side, this is illustrated by the ‘End the Fed’ campaign of US Congressman and former
presidential candidate Ron Paul or by former French President Nicolas Sarkozy who criticized repeatedly
the ECB during his election campaigns in 2007 and 2012. On the empirical side, among others, Havrilesky
(1991) and Mixon and Gibson (2002), but also Coleman (2001) and Siklos (2010) document the fact of
‘signaling’ from political leaders to central bankers. On the theoretical side, Lohmann (1992) has demon-
strated that, in some situations such as the occurrence of a negative supply shock, the probability of a
conflict between the government and the central bank increases.
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population at large. For example, studying the pattern of communication strategies
of several central banks, Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2007) find that the ECB Governing
Council members step up the frequency of communication if there is a need to explain
the monetary policy decision taken in the preceding Governing Council meeting. While
they show that financial markets tend to respond significantly stronger to communica-
tion prior to interest rate changes, their evidence is limited to financial markets’ reac-
tions. Extending the scope, Maier and Bezoen (2004) argue that external pressure on
the ECB stems mainly from politicians or from international organizations such as the
International Monetary Fund (IMF). Moreover, in contrast with their own evidence for
the Bundesbank, they also establish that interest groups (such as commercial banks)
hardly attempt to influence European monetary policy.2
Notwithstanding their intrinsic interests, these papers have focused on given seg-
ments of the population, while it can certainly be affirmed that monetary policy impacts
everyone’s everyday life. Starting from such a premise, the study of attitudes and val-
ues is now recognized as an important source of information for economists, and the
availability of the Eurobarometer survey data has put the European integration process
under the magnifying glass more than once (see, e.g., Gabel, 1998, or Nelsen and Guth,
2000). Concerning monetary issues in particular, the emergence of the Euro as a cur-
rency and its popular support has been examined, among others, by Gärtner (1997),
Hayo (1999) and Jonung (2004). But the trust of the Europeans in the ECB based on
the socio-demographic determinants of their support for it has not yet been exhaustively
explored. In fact, such literature is only emerging, and consists of the few papers we
refer to as being the closest to our work here below.
Kaltenthaler and Anderson (2001) analyze the support for a European monetary
policy, but in a sample over 1994–1997 when the single currency was not yet born.
Using the data from Eurobarometer waves 41-47, they conclude that national attitudes
dominate, and that the more people are attached to their national identity, the lower
their support for a common currency. An exploration along similar lines but larger in
scope is attempted by Hudson (2006), who presents some evidence with respect to trust,
showing that changes in an individual’s personal circumstances can also have an impact
on trust. Importantly, trust appears to build over time, experience being a key driver of
one’s trust. For example, unemployed people tend to have lower levels of trust not only
in the main economic institutions, but in other state institutions too, such as the police
and the law. Trust also differs in a systematic manner with respect to education and
household income. Age too has an impact on trust: it tends to increase as people grow
older. Hudson (2006) also provides some evidence on trust in the ECB, showing that the
standard socio-demographic variables are significant for trust. However, the data used
is for year 2001 only.
Banducci et al. (2009) examine the evolution of trust in the Euro, analyzing how
the inflationary effects of the transition to the new currency have been perceived by
the Europeans. They show that rising prices have reduced the support for the Euro,
although most of the surveyed people (two-thirds) still have a positive opinion of the
new currency. While this study is somewhat related to ours, its coverage (2000–2007)
and focus (on the Euro, and not on the European Central Bank) are more limited. Yet
very recently Kaltenthaler et al. (2010) have evaluated the distrust of the public opinion
in the ECB. They find that the distrust towards the ECB is stronger when people consider
that the bank is too autonomous to reflect their own preferences. Their results show in
2See also Maier et al. (2002) and Maier and Knapp (2002) for analyses of, respectively, the political
pressure on, and the support for, the Deutsche Bundesbank. There is, to our knowledge, no equivalent study
for the US, although Carvalho and Nechio (2012) look at the way lay people and professional forecasters
understand monetary policy, would the Fed follow a Taylor rule.
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particular that women are less likely to trust the ECB, whereas being older, and having a
higher education level improved the score. More surprisingly, at the background of the
extant literature on public support, they find no significant statistical evidence of a role
for unemployment, religious belief, and political orientation. However, differently from
our work here, they rely on a single survey wave (Eurobarometer 65.2 of 2006) and do
not consider inflation as an explanatory variable. Moreover, distrust is considered with
regard to the degree of independence the ECB enjoys, and not with regard to the policy
it implements.
Fischer and Hahn (2008) also measure trust in the ECB from answers to the Euroba-
rometer opinion polls conducted on representative samples of the whole European pop-
ulation. Using the proportion of trust in the ECB as their dependent variable, they show
that higher inflation reduces the trust in this institution. They also find that (lagged)
national income, proxied by GDP per capita, and GDP growth both influence trust in
the ECB positively, while unemployment-related variables do not seem to have an ef-
fect. Their study, however, considers only macro-determinants of the support for the
ECB. Roth (2009), Gros and Roth (2010), Ehrmann et al. (2010) and Wälti (2012) have
revisited such findings, yet focusing on the impact of the recent financial crisis on the
support for the ECB, and argue that the banking distress and the fiscal turmoils have
affected negatively the degree of trust in the ECB. Their results are in line with the
procyclical nature of trust in institutions highlighted by Stevenson and Wolfers (2011).
In a related empirical study Berggren et al. (2012) explore social trust as a key
determinant of central bank independence. They summarize the large and growing lit-
erature on trust, pointing out to the distinction between social trust and particularized
trust (Bjørnskov, 2007). Their focus is on social trust, understood as capturing the basic
outlook on people in general, unrelated to information about specific persons or organiz-
ations. Berggren et al. (2012) find a U-shaped link between central bank independence
and social trust: at low trust levels, the need for central bank independence in a society
is strong enough and dominates its low ability to implement reforms; at high trust levels
the ability for reforms is high and dominates the low need; at intermediate trust levels
there is neither need nor ability strong enough to generate independent central banks.
By contrast, our interest here is in studying the socio-demographic determinants of par-
ticularized trust, more precisely as reflected in the survey-documented public opinion
on a specific supranational and very influential institution, the ECB. To narrow down
further our domain of investigation, we focus on institutional trust that is delimited by
the question of how an institution, the ECB in particular, would benefit individuals, the
European citizens in particular. This may be denoted as a utilitarian dimension of insti-
tutional trust that is important in economic and monetary decisions, but it is certainly
not the only aspect of trust worth examining.
While the above-cited papers appear to be the closest to ours, our approach is em-
pirically more encompassing. We rely on micro-level data with the aim to elicit from the
Eurobarometer survey responses the most relevant socio-demographic determinants of
support for the ECB (i) over its entire history back to 1999 and (ii) covering all current
EU members (27 countries). One has to bear in mind that all EU members are supposed
to adopt the single currency (except Denmark and the United Kingdom, which bene-
fit from a special status). This perspective justifies the use of data not only from the
present Euro-area members but also from the whole EU. Consequently, we hypothesize
that such individual characteristics would matter beyond the national business cycle in
enhancing or not the trust of the European public in the ECB. We, therefore, apply a
pseudo-panel logistic regression model with both country fixed effects and time fixed
effects that isolates the variation in the data due to unobserved time-invariant cross-
country heterogeneity or common shocks and enables us to focus on which among the
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socio-demographic individual characteristics we are interested in matter most in influ-
encing the trust of the Europeans in the ECB.
Analyzing statistically the trust different segments of the population accord to the
ECB and its evolution over time and across groups of countries, we present evidence
that people with higher level of income and education and centre to right-wing political
orientation tend to support a conservative institution such as the ECB, mostly because
of a tighter alignment of views and interests. It may not come as a surprise that the
unemployed are among the socio-demographic groups that distrust the ECB the most,
together with the bottom quartiles of the income distribution and the people with the
minimum level of education. However, the main import of the present paper is to es-
tablish that socio-demographic determinants of the trust of the European population in
the ECB matter in a strong way, in addition and beyond the influence of inflation or
other macrovariables revealed in other studies. Consequently, our findings can help the
ECB to better formulate and implement its communication strategy with the EU public
in order to ensure its longer-run legitimacy, recently endangered by the EMU debt crisis
and the global depression, as our results also show.
The paper is structured as follows. The next section presents our data by a general
statistical analysis of the evolution of trust in the ECB extracted from the Eurobarometer
waves. Against this background, section 3 first motivates the socio-demographic determ-
inants of trust in the ECB, the macroeconomic control variables, and the econometric
methodology we employ, namely, survey-based pseudo-panel logistic regressions; it then
discusses our baseline estimation results and reports appropriate robustness checks. We
conclude by summarizing our key empirical findings and their policy implications.3
2 Evolution of Trust in the ECB: Data and Statistical Summary
Our data comes from the Eurobarometer survey. This survey, dealing with issues of gen-
eral interest, is conducted on behalf of the European Commission since 1973. The results
are published in Eurobarometer and are now made available on the Gesis website.4
2.1 Measuring Trust in the ECB from the Eurobarometer Survey
We have used Eurobarometer surveys 52.0 (November 1999) through 75.3 (May 2011),
selecting those waves of the survey that include the question on trust in the ECB we are
interested in. Table 1 provides the exact details.
[Table 1 about here]
The waves of the survey we employ cover all current EU member countries. Table 2
lists them by subgroup, as well as the relevant period coverage.
[Table 2 about here]
Among other questions, the respondents are asked about the importance of the major
European institutions, including the ECB, and their trust in them, in particular in the
ECB (Question n 28_6 in Eurobarometer 52.0), which is of our direct interest here, as
follows:
3For replication purposes, our Stata dataset, codes and estimation output are available upon request.
4http://zacat.gesis.org/webview/index.jsp
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“Q.28 And, for each of them, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to
trust it?
Q.28_6 The European Central Bank”
The responses are recorded in the following way: 1 for ‘Tend to trust’, 2 for ‘Tend not
to trust’, and 3 for ‘Don’t know’. We measure the trust in the European Central Bank by
transforming this categorical variable into a binary one, excluding the responses coded
3 that do not express an opinion. The binary discrete choice variable thus obtained be-
comes our dependent variable in the logistic regressions we report later on. However,
just excluding the ‘Don’t know’ category raises a problem, as people could be more in-
terested in economic matters when things turn bad. Looking at the data, we confirm
this cyclical nature of trust in the ECB: fewer people declare themselves in this third
category near the end of our sample period. Moreover, it may also be that people decide
first to express an opinion or not, and then on what their opinion would be, creating
a potential sample selection bias (no matter that the survey sample would be designed
as random). For these reasons our main estimation was complemented by two altern-
ative ones, relying on standard techniques in similar studies: (i) imputation to handle
missing data in a way resulting in valid statistical inference (Rubin, 1987); (ii) two-step
correction for sample selection bias (Heckman, 1976, 1979). Both alternative estima-
tion methods delivered qualitatively similar results, and we return to them with more
detail in the robustness analysis further below.
We have divided our country sample into two groups: ‘old EU15’ are the older 15
EU member states for which data is available in the Eurobarometer survey from 1999
through 2011; while 10 of the ‘new EU12’ joined EU in 2004 and two5 in 2007, and
data for the new EU12 countries is available in the Eurobarometer survey as from 2004.
Attitudes by country towards trust in the ECB are illustrated in Figure 1, in terms
of the proportion of those respondents who trust the central bank, taken as a long-run
average across the (relevant, for each EU member state) Eurobarometer survey waves.
[Figure 1 about here]
This average level of trust in the ECB is higher in the Netherlands (1999-2011) and
Malta and Estonia (2004-2011), where close to 80% of the respondents tend to trust
the ECB, while in the United Kingdom (1999-2011), by contrast, only a bit more than
40% of the people admit they trust the ECB. Note, however, that except in the United
Kingdom, in all remaining countries in our sample the (average, across the relevant
waves) support for the ECB according to the Eurobarometer survey exceeds half of the
respondents. In the top half of our sample in Figure 1, the average support for the
ECB is stronger than two-thirds of the respondents by nation. From this, it appears
that the ECB enjoys high credibility among the European population. As clear from the
figure too, the level of trust of people living in countries which joined the EU in 2004
or 2007 is generally higher than that in its founding members. Another important fact
apparent from Figure 1 is that Denmark and Bulgaria are two non-Euro-area countries
which are among the top ten countries with high average trust in the ECB.6 This justifies
further our decision to consider the non-Euro-area countries in our analysis, as well as
to examine possible differences of exchange rate peggers versus floaters among them.
5Bulgaria and Romania.
6Note, however, that both these countries maintain a fixed exchange rate regime of their national cur-
rencies to the Euro, so they are de facto in the Euro-area and ECB’s monetary policy affects them directly.
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2.2 Evolution of Trust in the ECB across Time and Country Subsamples
We first look at the annual evolution of the level of trust in the ECB by individual country
in our two subsamples of EU member countries, the old EU15 and the new EU12, as
documented by the Eurobarometer survey data plotted in figures 2 and 3, respectively.
[Figures 2 and 3 about here]
A considerable amount of variation is exhibited in the old EU15 subsample, while
the level of trust in the new EU12 subsample is less dispersed, and remaining above 60
percent until 2008. A drop in the trust in the ECB that can be attributed to the financial
crisis is observed after 2008 in all EU27 member states. On an individual country level,
figures 2 and 3 reveal that the lowest trust in the ECB, though fluctuating, has been
systematically recorded in the UK, followed by France, and recently Greece, among the
old EU15, whereas the highest level of support for the central bank has been attained in
the Netherlands, Ireland before the 2008 banking crisis there, and Denmark after 2005;
among the new EU12, the trust in the ECB has persistently been weak and declining in
Latvia and Hungary, while remaining high, yet also declining, in Estonia and Malta.
[Tables 3 and 4 about here]
We now briefly discuss the key features of our data in terms of summary statist-
ics characterizing the evolution of the distribution of the support for the ECB. Table 3
provides a first glance on the trust summary statistics in the Eurobarometer survey across
its main socio-demographic categories and groupings within. The respective means sug-
gest, in a preview before any econometric estimation to check for statistical significance,
a broad picture of who supports the ECB more, and who less, consistent with most of
our results highlighted in the introduction. Table 4 then reports the descriptive statist-
ics characterizing the support for the ECB by key subgroups and corresponding survey
waves, also thus outlining the evolving trends in its distribution. These trends and the
shape of the distribution over time are illustrated in the several figures we comment
next.
[Figures 4 and 5 about here]
Figure 4 illustrates, in terms of boxplot diagrams, the change in the distribution of
trust in the ECB by the old EU15 countries between the earliest Eurobarometer wave in
our dataset, of Oct-Nov 1999 (Eurobarometer 52.0), and Feb-Mar 2004 (Eurobarometer
61.0), the last wave before the new EU member states were included too. It is clear
that trust in the ECB by the EU15 has become stronger during 1999-2004 (the mean
goes up from 66.14% to 68.44% and the median from 64.00% to 67.13%) and less
dispersed (the standard deviation falls from 12.20% to 9.78%, and the maximum falls
whereas the minimum rises, thus decreasing the spread between them from 49 down to
35 percentage points). This reveals a build-up of credibility by the newly-created ECB.
Figure 5 illustrates, in turn, the corresponding change in the distribution of trust in
the ECB by all EU27 countries between the earliest Eurobarometer wave in our dataset
where data on trust for the new EU member states are available (Oct-Nov 2004, Euroba-
rometer 62.0), and the latest wave in our dataset for all these countries (May 2011,
Eurobarometer 75.3). Now a reversal in the trend in the distribution of trust in the ECB
by the EU27 is apparent during 2004-2011: trust has become weaker (the mean drops
from 73.89% to 57.81% and the median from 73.23% to 59.61%) and more dispersed
(the standard deviation rises from 8.34% to 12.97%, with both the maximum and the
minimum falling but increasing the spread between them, from 33 up to 53 percentage
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points). Yet a comparison between the old EU15 and the new EU12 reveals that the new
members have a higher level of trust in the ECB. In both survey waves (Eurobarometer
62.0 and Eurobarometer 75.3), the new EU12 are characterized by summary trust stat-
istics that are superior to the respective ones for the old EU15, notwithstanding the drop
in the support for the ECB the financial crisis caused in both groups of countries.
[Figure 6 about here]
Another illustration regarding the evolution of the shape of the distribution of trust
in the ECB among the EU member states is suggested in Figure 6. It provides the kernel
density function (kdf)7 for the same four waves of the Eurobarometer survey. What is
easy to notice in the left-panel graph in Figure 6, concerning the old EU15 subgroup
between 1999 and 2004, is the clear tendency of an increasing trust in the ECB revealed
in Figure 4. Namely, the support of the kdf narrows down while the mode moves both
right and up. The opposite tendency is displayed by the right-panel graph in Figure 6,
concerning all EU27 member countries between 2004 and 2011, of a decreasing and
more dispersed trust in the ECB, consistent with Figure 5. The support of the kdf this
time shifts leftward, especially the lower tail, and its spread is consequently increased,
while the shape of the kdf flattens, with the mode moving down and left, and skews into
a less symmetric distribution, with mass shifting leftward.
The likely explanations for the observed trends in the distribution of trust in the ECB
we summarized include, as few recent studies we already quoted have emphasized, the
tensions that arise fundamentally from potential asymmetry of shocks across the E(M)U
member states and, hence, from the ensuing diverging national policy requirements. In
essence, while the new EU member states brought in, on average, increased trust in the
ECB, they also brought in many additional problems and debates about the social cohes-
iveness of the political, economic and monetary union. Moreover, the global financial
crisis since August 2007 and the subsequent aggravation of the sovereign debt problems
of several European nations have further threatened even to disintegrate the Euro-area.
3 Determinants of Trust in the ECB: Econometric Estimation
Having summarized the evolving distribution of trust in the ECB, we next estimate the
determinants of these changes. Along the lines of the existing literature dealing with
public preferences for economic issues, socio-demographic variables are particularly
considered, in addition to business cycle and institutional controls.
3.1 Variables Entering the Logistic Regressions
The role of individual characteristics is measured through categorical variables such
as education, income, employment status, economic expectations, political placement,
gender, age. Hyperinflation and fiscal/SGP dummies and certain interaction terms are
also employed, as we discuss next.
Walstad (1997) and Walstad and Rebeck (2002) observe that education is an im-
portant determinant of an individual’s preference concerning an economic issue, as well
as measuring labor market skills and cognitive abilities (Scheve, 2004). But there is no
consensus about the effect of education on an economic issue: Hainmüller and Hiscox
(2006) find that people with college education are more pro-trade while other forms of
education are not significant in evaluating trade policy. In our case, education is hypo-
thesized to be linked to an understanding of the costs of inflation, of the operation of the
7Using Epanechnikov (optimal) weighting and Silverman (data-determined) bandwidth.
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monetary policy transmission mechanism, and of the macroeconomic role and institu-
tional mandate of the central bank. Assuming that a higher level of education is related,
among other things, to a better understanding of economics, education would thus be
one main determinant of support for the ECB. In the Eurobarometer survey, ‘education’
is measured by the age of the respondent when s/he stopped full-time education and is
an ordered categorical variable on a scale of 1 to 4; 1 for ‘up to 15 years’, 2 for ‘16 to 19
years’, 3 for ‘20+ years’ and 4 for ‘still studying’.
The income variable in the Eurobarometer survey ranges from 1 to 4 indicating
whether the respondent is in the first, second, third, or fourth quartile of the income
distribution for the respondent’s country. This variable proved influential in Jayadev
(2006) for people’s attitude towards inflation. In our case, income is hypothesized to
pertain to an individual’s self-interest: for example, if they own nominal assets and aim
to preserve their purchasing power. Such a motivation suggests that individual income
should be among the main socio-demographic determinants of ECB support.8
The literature has suggested that employment status could also be important, with
the unemployed people less supportive of an inflation-bashing central bank, as low in-
flation levels could lead to a distortion of the Phillips curve trade-off (see Akerlof et al.,
1996). Such a distortion may push up the sacrifice ratio, and be perceived as costly
by (part of) the electorate, notably the unemployed and retired people. To capture
differences across employment status, we therefore include ‘occupation’ dummies for
the unemployed and the retired. As the probability of being unemployed, or to have
one’s income reduced, is linked to business cycle fluctuations, we also take into account
the economic expectations the surveyed declare. This variable is coded as to whether
economic conditions are anticipated to ‘get worse’, ‘improve’ or ‘stay the same’.
Political ideology is proxied by a political placement indicator, i.e. the way people
position themselves on the political axis from ‘left’ to ‘right’ through ‘centre’. Political
placement can obviously change individual attitudes towards important economic issues
and institutions, notably inflation and the central bank. As trust in the ECB could be
related to a pro-European or pro-integration bias, we also include a dummy variable
to capture trust in the European Commission, constructed out from the same response
categories in the Eurobarometer survey as the ones for trust in the ECB.
Previous studies (Nelsen and Guth, 2000; Scheve, 2004) have revealed that women
are less concerned about economic issues, so we add gender in our regressions. Age
can also be important with respect to inflation aversion and, hence, central bank inde-
pendence issues related to the role of the ECB. Farvaque et al. (2010) and Farvaque and
Mihailov (2009) show that an older population acts as a strong weight against inflation,
while Malmendier and Nagel (2009) present evidence that individuals of different ages
react differently to past inflation experiences.
Related to the two preceding considerations could be the experience of hyperinfla-
tion some people might have lived through. We thus include in our estimates a dummy
variable with value 1 if the country has known a hyperinflation episode in the 20th cen-
tury. This is the case for Germany, Greece and Hungary for the immediate aftermath
of World War I and/or II and for Bulgaria, Poland, Romania and Slovenia in specific
periods during their transition from a centrally-planned to market economy over the
last decade of the past century. As many hyperinflation episodes are related to fiscal
policy outcomes, we also include dummy variables to account for the fulfillment of the
Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) fiscal criteria: SGPDEBT has a value equal to one if
the country shows a public debt to GDP ratio superior to the 60% limit, while SGPDEF
is equal to one if the country shows a public deficit to GDP ratio superior to the 3%
threshold.
8Ideally, data on wealth and on asset detention would be preferable, but are not available.
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We control for the role of macroeconomic variables by including regressors such as
inflation, real GDP growth, the unemployment rate and some transformations of these
variables (lags, expectations, perceptions or other). However, with view to the price sta-
bility goal of the ECB, actual inflation is the most natural macroeconomic determinant
of trust in the ECB, which we report further down in our regressions.9 Data on inflation
comes from the Eurostat, measured as the annual percentage change in the Harmon-
ized Index of Consumer Prices (HICP). Focusing attention on actual inflation as the key
business cycle control is even more important with regard to the question at hand, since
inflation experience can strongly shape people’s preferences and, thus, their attitudes to
the central bank, as Erhmann and Tzamourani (2012) show. Given that our EU sample
is larger than the EMU subsample of countries, we also include dummy variables to
control for the potential differences in the public support for the ECB arising from in-
flation targeting monetary policy frameworks with floating exchange rates versus fixed
exchange rate monetary policies among the non-Euro-area EU countries.
Since our dependent variable is a binary categorical variable – taking the values
of one and zero according to whether a particular respondent tends to trust or not,
respectively, the European Central Bank – a survey-based quasi-panel logistic regression
model with both country fixed and time fixed effects is well-suited for our purpose
here of isolating away the aggregate variation in the data and focusing on the effect
of specific socio-demographic determinants on trust in the ECB.10 Our baseline model
therefore takes the following form:
Trustijt = f(Infjt; Dem
0
ijt; Pol
0
ijt; EcoExpijt; Djt; Cj ; Tt; c) + ijt (1)
Trustijt is the opinion of a respondent i in country j at the time/wave t of the
Eurobarometer survey. Infjt is the measure of inflation at t in the j-th country.
11 Dem0ijt
is a vector of ‘demographic’ variables such as gender, age, education, employment status
and income, Pol0ijt is a vector of ‘political’ variables such as the political ideology of the
i-th respondent in the j-th country at t; and the trust in the European Commission, and
EcoExpijt are the expectations regarding the future economic situation by the respond-
ent. Given our task, we allow for unobserved cross-sectional heterogeneity by including
country fixed effects, Cj , in our estimation as well as for time/wave fixed effects, Tt, that
capture time trends common to all countries. ijt is the error term of the regression, c
the constant term, and we also add some dummies, Djt, discussed further below in the
versions of (1) we estimated (see the reported tables with results).
As is standard in panel-data regressions, country fixed effects, Cj , are intended to
pick up unobserved time-invariant country heterogeneity. Fischer and Hahn (2008)
stress that trust in the ECB is likely to depend on national differences in mentality, his-
tory and institutions. In the Eurobarometer survey data we employ, any time-invariant
framing effects will also be reflected in the country fixed effects. As is standard in panel-
data analysis too, time fixed effects, Tt, are meant to control for unobserved aggregate
shocks that would otherwise introduce omitted variable bias and impair statistical infer-
ence. Wälti (2012) argues in favor of a similar estimation strategy in a context close to
ours, but using a measure of net trust (while we use a 0-1 dependent variable), ignor-
9Preliminary estimates (available upon request) with lags of the inflation rate, with inflation and infla-
tion squared, or replacing inflation by other business cycle controls such as GDP growth (lagged or not)
or unemployment (lagged or not) delivered similar qualitative results: at best, the marginal effect of these
alternative macroeconomic variables is very small and rarely significant.
10It should be kept in mind that the Eurobarometer survey is not a true panel, i.e. the respondents are
changed in each wave.
11In our empirical implementation, it is taken to be proxied by the average HICP annual inflation rate
in the respective year of the Eurobaromater survey. Alternative measures of observed and perceived (or
expected) inflation are reported in the robustness section further below.
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ing to correct for selection bias (while we do that) and focusing only on 12 Euro-area
countries (while we look at all 27 EU members).
We estimate the parameters of our empirical model in (1) using logit regressions.
Since we are merging country-level inflation with micro-data, it is important to consider
the possibility that disturbances will be correlated across countries. Hence, standard
errors are clustered by country and require the much weaker assumption that errors are
independent across countries but not necessarily across every survey respondent within
a country (Moulton, 1990).
Another issue in the analysis is the weighting of the survey data. We follow the
proposal of DuMouchel and Duncan (1983) to include sampling weights and interaction
terms between the weights and the independent variables in the regressions to detect
possible misspecification. In almost all cases, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the
coefficients of the sampling weights and the interaction terms are equal to zero. This
indicates that our results are not sensitive to the weighting and thus we report them on
unweighted data.
3.2 Baseline Empirical Results
As described above, for the older 15 EU member states data is available for the whole
1999-2011 period. However, as the new 12 EU member states are covered only from
2004 on, we provide, as a point of departure, estimates for the earlier subperiod 1999-
2004 and, for comparison purposes, also estimates for the whole period. More precisely,
we estimated the following version of our baseline logistic regression (1):
Trustijt = f(Infjt; Dem
0
ijt; Pol
0
ijt; [EcoExp3ijt]; Cj ; Tt; Djt; c) + ijt; (2)
where Dem0ijt = (Age4ijt; Edu4ijt; [Inc4ijt] ; Genijt; Unemijt; Rtdijt)
0
and Pol0ijt = (Pol3ijt; EUComijt)
0
:
The ‘demographic’ vector contains ordered categorical variables and dummies: Age4ijt
is the age group of the respondent in 4 categories: 15-24 years, 25-44 years, 45-64
years, 65+ years; Edu4ijt is the education level of the respondent in 4 categories: up
to 15 years of age at the time of obtaining the highest degree, 16-19 years, 20+ years,
still studying; Inc4ijt is the income quartile of the respondent (in 4 categories). The
‘political’ vector contains the trust in the EU Commission and one ordered categorical
variable: Pol3ijt is the political placement of the respondent in 3 categories: left, centre
and right. EcoExp3ijt indicates the expectation of the respondents about the economic
situation in the next twelve months with response options given by ‘better’, ‘worse’ or
‘same’. The key dummies we use refer to the gender of the respondent, Genijt, and
whether s/he is unemployed, Unemijt, or retired, Rtdijt; EUComijt is the dummy for
trust in the EU Commission. The variables in square brackets are available only for
certain subsamples, as we explain next.
Table 5 presents the regression results from estimating (2) in four specifications, the
second one including income quartiles and the fourth one including economic expecta-
tions.12
[Table 5 about here]
As the Eurobarometer surveys discontinue publishing these income quartile charac-
teristics of the respondents after 2004, our income quartile regressors appear only in
12The data on economic expectations is not available in most of the survey waves before 2004. Its
significance has been checked by excluding/including it in specifications (3) and (4) in Table 5.
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specification (2) in Table 5 and not when estimates are reported up through 2011. Such
a discontinuity causes concern, though, as our results confirm that income is a signific-
ant determinant of trust in the ECB. More precisely, as can be read off in specification
(2) in Table 5, trust in the ECB is an increasing function of income (quartile): the richer
the respondents are, the more they trust the ECB. Due to the mentioned limitation in
the Eurobarometer survey waves after 2004, not containing income quartile data, we
cannot further exploit and cross-check this particular finding in our ‘updated’ samples
through 2011, also including the 12 new EU member states. Comparing specifications
(1) and (2) in Table 5, one can say that although accounting for income quartiles is
clearly justified, it does not modify substantively the other regression results. That is,
apart from the loss of statistical significance of inflation in specification (2) relative to
(1), the rest of the regression results look pretty much the same except for some minor
nuances.
We find that: women trust less the ECB than men; age appears as a significant vari-
able when the sample period is the largest, with the older people showing stronger
support for the ECB; education clearly matters too, as people with a higher level of edu-
cation (and those still studying) trust the ECB more than those with lower education
levels. Furthermore, trust in the ECB monotonically increases as one goes from ‘left’
through ‘centre’ and to ‘right’ in the political spectrum. This result might have been
expected given that the European Central Bank is generally considered as a rather con-
servative institution. Consistent with related earlier findings, our occupation dummy
convincingly shows that unemployed people distrust the ECB. Economic expectations
are also strongly significant, with the expected sign: the better the expected future, the
higher the degree of trust in the ECB.
Most importantly, actual inflation is not significant at the 1% level in our estimated
specifications (2), (3) and (4) of Table 5 once the socio-demographic characteristics
of the respondents are taken into account. These added socio-demographic regressors
thus complement, and look beyond the influence of, the few macrovariables employed
in, for example, Fischer and Hahn (2008) and Wälti (2012) as potential determinants
of the trust in the ECB. And, among the socio-demographic variables with the strongest
effect on the support for the ECB by the European population at large are, notably, the
higher-level education, the unemployment status, the two top income quartiles and the
center-to-right political orientation.13
All in all, a major outcome of these first estimates is that the impact of most if
not all of our various socio-demographic variables remains statistically significant and
economically interpretable, in addition and beyond the simultaneous impact of inflation
or lack of it.14 These two types of determinants of the support the European population
accords to the ECB, macroeconomic versus socio-demographic ones, have so far been
studied in the literature mostly in separation. A comparison of regression (1) to its
wider sample versions in (3) and (4), in Table 5, confirms that actual inflation is not
found empirically to be among the key determinants of trust in the ECB based on the
Eurobarometer survey waves. Another change is that older people (45-64 and 65+) are
now supportive of the central bank too (at the 1% level of significance). This is the only
13It could be argued that, given the relatively low level of inflation in the Euro-area, its low variance
during our sample period, and the fact that the Euro-area is also characterized by persistent intra-zone
dispersion in inflation rates (see, e.g., Altissimo et al., 2011; Gregoriou et al., 2011), inflation does not
appear significant because its impact is already captured by the fixed effects. Nevertheless, our estimates
show that including other socio-demographic variables is essential to have a better understanding of the
issue at stake.
14Removal of inflation terms that come out statistically insignificant from the reported regressions does
not change the essence of the results for the significant variables kept in. Additional tables confirming these
robustness findings are available from the authors.
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qualitative modification of the results we reported when comparing earlier specifications
(1) and (2) in Table 5, as well as some changes in the degree of significance of the
dummies related to the SGP criteria. We return to these particular findings with a likely
interpretation later on, after considering analogous estimates for the 12 new EUmember
states, separately as the ‘new EU12’ subgroup and together with the ‘old EU15’ countries,
as ‘all EU27’.
We next estimated an analogous version of model (2) for the new EU12 countries
separately and together with the old EU15 countries, but excluding the income categor-
ical variable (discontinued in 2004 and, thus, not available for the new EU12 member
states) from the ‘demographic’ vector, which now contains the remaining categorical
variables, as below:
Trustijt = f(Infjt; Dem
0
ijt; Pol
0
ijt; EcoExp3ijt; Cj ; Tt; Djt; c) + ijt; (3)
where Dem0ijt = (Age4ijt; Edu4ijt; Genijt; Unemijt; Rtdijt)
0
and Pol0ijt = (Pol3ijt; EUComijt)
0
:
Table 6 presents the results for the new EU12 countries in 2004-2011, specification
(1), as well as for the whole sample, i.e. all EU27, over two periods of time, 2004-2011
(specification (2)) and 1999-2011 (specifications (3) and (4)).
[Table 6 about here]
The age categories do not influence trust in the ECB in the new EU12 countries. The
rest of the results are qualitatively similar, for the political, education and occupation
variables. Also, while gender still significantly and negatively affects the support for the
ECB, the coefficient’s magnitude for the average marginal effect is almost three times
weaker in the case of the new EU12 estimates. These differences in the results can partly
be due to the much shorter sample, 14 waves of the Eurobarometer only in 2004-2011,
versus 24 waves for the old EU15 group in 1999-2011, and partly to the fact that except
Malta and Cyprus (as from 2004), Slovenia (as from 2007) and Slovakia (as from 2010)
the remaining eight countries in the new EU12 group do not (yet) share the common
currency, the Euro, issued by the ECB and directly influenced by its monetary policy (to
which we come back further in the robustness section below).
More importantly, our main conclusions from Table 5 carry over to Table 6. Namely,
the estimated trust in the ECB does not appear affected by the inflation rate, but rather
by the same set of key socio-demographic characteristics of the Eurobarometer respond-
ents we employ. We again find, now in the new EU12 subgroup of countries (as it was in
the old EU15 subgroup), that the ECB is mostly supported by people with right political
orientation and the highest level of education (and still studying). At the same time,
and by analogy with the results reported in all specifications in Table 5, women and
unemployed distrust the ECB the most.
Having presented our results so far by distinct country subsamples, that is, for the
old EU15 region versus the new EU12 region, it is finally not surprising what ‘blending’
these EU subgroups altogether produces, as reflected in the last three columns of Table
6. We first estimate the same baseline logistic regression for all our 27 countries, all
EU27, over the subperiod 2004-2011 when data for the new EU12 becomes available
in the Eurobarometer survey waves, and our results are reported in the column under
specification (2) in Table 6. We then pool the subperiods and subgroups together, and re-
estimate for the whole ‘all EU27’ country sample over the entire 1999-2011 time period
(with 24 waves for the old EU15 and only the latest 14 waves for the new EU12 in the
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whole group of all EU27). Specification (2) in Table 6 looks very similar to specification
(1) in Table 5, with only retirees now – i.e. when the new EU12 and the later subperiod
2004-2011 are allowed to shape out our findings – becoming statistically significant.
Specifications (3) and (4), in turn, are very close to specification (2) in Table 6. Most
importantly, considering together all data does not restore the statistical significance
and the sign and magnitude relevance of the key macroeconomic variable affecting the
trust in the ECB, namely, observed inflation: compare specification (3) in Table 6 with
specification (1) in Table 5, as was noted earlier.
Let us sum up next what we learn from employing the various dummy variables and
certain interaction terms. Beginning with the dummy for countries having experienced
hyperinflation, it appears as statistically significant only in the old EU15 subsample in
Table 5, in all four columns. Its average marginal effect coefficient has a negative sign,
which implies that trust in the ECB is lower in countries such as Germany where after the
hyperinflation history in the 1920s and 1940s a credible central bank had emerged and
consolidated, the Deutsche Bundesbank. The hyperinflation dummy is not statistically
significant, however, for the new EU12 subsample and for all EU27 countries in Table 6.
Our ‘fiscal profligacy’ dummies, capturing higher deficit or debt ratios to GDP than
those imposed by the SGP, seem more informative. In particular, the average marginal
effect coefficient of the dummy for higher level of debt to GDP than the SGP limit is
statistically significant and negative in the old EU15 subgroup over the whole period,
1999-2011 (the last two columns in Table 5). This means that the old EU15 population
in countries with highly indebted governments does not support the ECB as much as the
population in the remaining, less indebted old EU15 member states. The same is true
for all EU27 countries over the entire sample, 1999-2011 (the last two columns in Table
6). Yet, it seems that the ECB may be considered as a check on profligate governments in
the new EU12 subsample (the first column in Table 6), as the dummy related to the SGP
debt criterion is now coming out with a significant positive coefficient. The changing
sign on this coefficient as one moves from specification (1) to the other in Table 6 also
reveals perhaps the rationality of respondents, who appear even more worried by the
lack of discipline in public finances many EU27 countries now face. Important deficits
and/or debt levels, especially as the financial and Euro-debt crisis has hit the old EU15
members more severely than the new EU12 ones, have impacted their public finances
more strongly, and then the trust in the ECB as revealed by our estimates (see also
below our robustness check on the financial and Euro-debt crisis period). As for the
group of 10 new EU members that joined in 2004, our dummy EU2004 comes out with
a significant and negative coefficient over 2004-2011 in most variants of the estimation
(including the robustness checks to be discussed later), which indicates a lower degree
of trust in the ECB in these 10 countries.
The interaction terms we employed checking for various possible combined effects
on the trust in the ECB proved not statistically significant most of the time, unless on a
few occasions that are reported in our tables. Just two such interaction terms, namely,
hyperinflation  SGP debt and hyperinflation  old EU15 were found statistically sig-
nificant in some of our econometric specifications, including the robustness checks dis-
cussed in the subsection to follow. As far as the baseline estimation in tables 5 and 6 is
concerned the interaction of hyperinflation with SGP debt is hard to interpret, while the
interaction of hyperinflation with the old EU15 subgroup results in a significant negative
average marginal effect when the whole sample of 27 EU members is estimated over the
entire period of 1999-2011 as well as over the more recent subperiod of 2004-2011 (see
the last three columns in Table 6).
Interestingly, our dummy for the original EU6 founding countries comes out system-
atically across the variants of our estimation with a negative and significant average
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marginal effect coefficient, while our dummy for the EMU member states displays the
opposite significant sign, and roughly three times lower magnitude of the respective
coefficients. These econometric findings seem to reflect some opposite trends in the
public opinion concerning the ECB in the founding EU6 versus the much larger sub-
group of the current EMU members.
Finally, our dummies for inflation targeting countries with floating exchange rate
regimes and for fixed exchange rate regimes within the EU27 are generally insignificant
in the largest sample.
All in all, the results we discussed show that higher education and/or income levels
seem the dominant determinant of support for the ECB, coming out with statistically
significant coefficients for the average marginal effects and the expected positive sign in
our regressions. Our empirical work thus corroborates the two key socio-demographic
sources of trust in the ECB we hypothesized. The findings we reported also reveal that
the usual macrovariable to help evaluate central bank performance and build up support
for its monetary policy, actual inflation, matters less (or even often does not matter
statistically) for maintaining trust in the ECB once socio-demographic characteristics of
the Eurobarometer survey respondents are also included in the regressions.
3.3 Robustness Checks
The definition of the dummies we used for hyperinflation as well as for SGP debt and
SGP deficit may appear as taking out a lot of variability in the data from the outset
and/or could raise doubts for under-identification problems, when they are coupled
with the fixed effects, even though the non-linear estimation method would allow the
convergence of the algorithm. We have, thus, re-estimated the same regressions as the
ones we reported in the preceding subsection without these dummies and their interac-
tion terms, and can confirm the robustness of the results to their inclusion/absence.15
As was noted when defining our binary measure of trust in the ECB, the estimates we
presented above do not take into account the ‘Don’t know’ category in the Eurobarometer
survey response coding. While Wälti (2012) in his related panel-data work with a focus
on the impact of the global financial crisis on a different measure of net trust neglected
the implications of the mentioned category altogether, we did check for the robustness
of our empirical findings along this dimension. More precisely, the respondents in the
‘Don’t know’ category were imputed using standard techniques (Rubin, 1987) and all
equations were re-estimated. This did not lead to any qualitative modifications of the
results we reported in the preceding subsection.16
Yet, one cannot completely ignore the possibility that respondents, even in a random
survey sample, first decide to have an opinion or not, and only then which opinion to
have. Therefore, as an alternative of the imputation analysis, we also ran a Heckman
(1976, 1979) selection model, as is common in the literature.17 We concluded in favor
of the absence of a selection bias in our analysis.18
Furthermore, the estimates we presented make use of the survey respondents’ na-
tional inflation rate. Yet, as our goal is to analyze the trust in the ECB by European
15Full results are available upon request.
16Full results are available upon request.
17When the correlation between the error terms in the regression and estimation equations in a Heckman
(1976) selection model is nonzero, standard regression techniques applied to the regression equation yield
biased results. To obtain consistent, asymptotically efficient estimates for the parameters of interest, we
applied the Heckman (1979) two-step efficient estimator. This approach is an appropriate alternative with
large datasets as ours, in which maximum likelihood estimation of the parameters may be time consuming.
We, therefore, performed the estimation with Heckman (1979) correction for selection bias.
18Full results are available upon request.
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polities, a natural question arises about the relevant inflation rate that should be con-
sidered. For a resident of a country belonging to the Euro-area (or linked to it by a fixed
exchange rate), the relevant inflation rate is the one targeted by the ECB. However, for a
respondent from a country outside the Euro-area (and not linked to it by a peg regime),
the support delivered to the ECB could depend on the difference between the Euro-area
inflation rate and the domestic one. This is so especially given the fact that the ECB has
been quite successful in achieving its 2% inflation target, except for the last few years,
due to the crisis.
To deal with these other aspects of robustness, we next present estimates based on
three alternatives. The first series of estimates, regressions (1) to (4) in Table 7, use
the subsample of countries that are not members of the European Monetary Union, and
consider the difference between their national inflation rate and the Euro-area inflation
rate. As can be seen, the results are fundamentally similar to the preceding ones. The
second series of robustness checks, regressions (1) to (4) in Table 8, consider expected
inflation in the EMU subsample, and not realized inflation.19 Here again, as can be
seen, the qualitative essence of our empirical results remains robust. Moreover, compar-
ing this particular estimated specification on a restricted sample of just the Euro-area
countries with the baseline empirical findings concerning all EU members reveals no
substantive difference between these two groups along the issue we investigate. To ex-
pand on this dimension of potential divide of EMU vs non-EMU states, the third series
of robustness checks, regressions (1) to (4) in Table 9, finally look for a possible role
of inflation perceptions by using the national inflation rate for the countries that do not
belong to the Euro area, but the Euro-area inflation rate for the EMU members. As can
be seen, again, no significant difference emerges from those estimates and the preceding
ones. Hence, inflation (whatever the measure we consider) remains mostly insignific-
ant in our regressions. Concerning the socio-demographic variables, the results show
that the effect of education is the same (the higher the education level, the higher the
support), people from the right are still more supportive of the ECB, while unemployed,
retirees and women tend to be less supportive of the ECB.20
[Tables 7, 8 and 9 about here]
To judge about the impact of the global financial crisis on the support for the ECB
accorded by the population in the EU, we ran estimates on the last subperiod of our
sample, i.e. 2007 to 2011. Roth (2009) and Wälti (2012), for example, show that
the support for the ECB has strongly decreased over the last years of our sample, so
we checked if our own reported results are robust to the crisis period. As can be seen
from Table 10, our findings are mostly unchanged, except for the dummies related to
the hyperinflation episodes and the fiscal stance. The hyperinflation dummy is now
significant and negative in both types of countries, as well as its interaction with the
dummies related to the SGP criteria. This seems to indicate certain disapproval by the
respondents with regard to the policies the ECB has implemented during the crisis to
back up the sovereign issuers in the Euro area, and also a good understanding of the
fact that such policies may fuel inflation if they are not reversed.
19The definition and source of inflation expectations in the Euro area are taken from the ECB
Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF). This is a quarterly survey of expectations for the rates
of inflation, real GDP growth and unemployment in the euro area for several horizons, together
with a quantitative assessment of the uncertainty surrounding them. The data are available at
http://www.ecb.int/stats/prices/indic/forecast/html/index.en.html
20A minor difference with respect to our baseline results is that the interaction of hyperinflation with
SGP debt now appears with a statistically significant positive, not negative, coefficient once economic
expectations are included as an additional regressor over the whole period as well as over 2004-2007,
and given that actual inflation in Table 7 is measured in a perhaps more directly relevant way to national
perceptions of what the ECB can do about it or not.
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[Table 10 about here]
Finally, as far as potential combined effects are concerned, we ran the regressions
we have reported also including additional interaction terms, namely gender  income,
gender  education and income  education.21 The terms interacting with income
came out insignificant, while gender  education was found statistically significant only
for high levels and negative.22
All in all, then, these robustness checks confirm quite convincingly the spirit of the
preceding results and interpretations. They show, more precisely, that one principal
source of trust in the ECB we hypothesized, the understanding of the costs of inflation,
of monetary policy transmission and of the institutional role of the central bank, with
education being its key determinant, is the most supported by the sample we used.
Although we cannot neglect the relevance of another major source of trust in the ECB,
income, our exploration along these lines was less conclusive due to the lack of data.
4 Concluding Comments
Our empirical answers to the question we posed in the title to this paper can be summar-
ized as follows. Who supports the ECB? People with higher – rather than lower – level
of education, perhaps because these can better appreciate the role of the ECB within the
E(M)U; people with higher – rather than lower – level of income, possibly because these
tend to be more concerned that price stability is protected, which is the mandate of the
ECB; people with centre to right-wing – rather than left-wing – political orientation, as
these are likely to be more conservative and, thus, more ‘aligned’ with the usual central
banking functions and policies; people with optimistic expectations on the economic
situation, perhaps because these see the ECB as partly contributing to shaping out eco-
nomic trends in the E(M)U; men – rather than women – as they might overall be more
politics- or business-inclined. Not surprisingly, perhaps, the unemployed are among the
socio-demographic groups that distrust the ECB the most, as they would care primarily
to find a job, and so a source of income. By analogy, the bottom quartiles of the income
distribution and people with the minimum level of education also belong to the social
layers that display the weakest support, if at all, for the ECB and its priority policies.
Our findings also make another important point: most of the micro-characteristics of
the European population we employed in our empirical work matter for its trust in the
ECB, while the control for actual (as well as expected, perceived, lagged or transformed)
inflation in the Euro area or relative to the non-Euro part of the EU was surprisingly
not found statistically significant most of the time. Simply studying macroeconomic
determinants of trust in the ECB, as common in this emerging literature so far, would
therefore miss a whole set of micro-based socio-demographic determinants. As our
results show, these latter determinants led to statistically significant and economically
interpretable results in a broader context of investigating the support for the ECB by the
population of the EU member states that looks beyond the business cycle and national
institutional context using the data from the Eurobarometer survey waves.
The implications of such results are clearly essential when it comes to formulating
and implementing a central bank’s communication policy, and in particular the commu-
nication strategy of the ECB. Over the recent years, the intense debates on the EMU debt
crisis together with the weak global economy have led to a decline of the trust in the
21These additional results are available from the authors.
22Such a result may imply that women with higher degrees of education tend to be less supportive of the
ECB when compared to less educated women, a curious minor reversal of what we reported for men and
for both sexes in general.
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ECB. Our results, in effect, identify the groups that should be targeted in such commu-
nication with the public if the ECB has to improve its policy credibility and longer-run
legitimacy. Their relevance for ECB’s communication strategy is especially high in the
years ahead of further challenges and likely reforms of the EMU.
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Figure 1: Average Support for the ECB by Country, % – All EU27. Note: Statistics
for the old EU15 countries are based on 1999-2011 (24 Eurobarometer survey waves
between EB52.0, Oct-Nov, 1999 and EB75.3, May 2011), while statistics for the new
EU12 member states are based on 2004-2011 (14 Eurobarometer survey waves between
EB62.0, Oct-Nov, 2004 and EB75.3, May 2011). Source: Authors’ calculations based on
Eurobarometer survey data.
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Figure 2: Trust in the ECB by Country, % – Old EU15, 1999-2011. Source: Authors’
calculations based on Eurobarometer survey data.
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Figure 3: Trust in the ECB by Country, % – New EU12, 2004-2011. Source: Authors’
calculations based on Eurobarometer survey data.
22 Farvaque, Hayat and Mihailov (Revised: October 2012)
0
20
40
60
80
100
EB52.0 Oct­Nov,1999 EB61.0 Feb­Mar,2004
Figure 4: Distribution of Trust in the ECB, %, Old EU15, 1999-2004 – Boxplots. Source:
Authors’ calculations based on Eurobarometer survey data.
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Figure 5: Distribution of Trust in the ECB, %, All EU27, 2004-2011 – Boxplots. Source:
Authors’ calculations based on Eurobarometer survey data.
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Table 1: Eurobarometer Data Coverage by Survey Wave
No in Our Sample Original No Original 4-Digit Code Period Year Year Wave
1 52.0 3204 Oct-Nov 1999 2nd
2 53.0 3296 Apr-May 2000 1st
3 54.1 3387 Nov-Dec 2000 2nd
4 55.2 3507 Apr-May 2001 1st
5 56.2 3627 Oct-Nov 2001 2nd
6 57.1 3639 Mar-Apr 2002 1st
7 58.1 3693 Oct-Nov 2002 2nd
8 59.1 3904 Mar-Apr 2003 1st
9 60.1 3938 Oct-Nov 2003 2nd
10 61.0 4056 Feb-Mar 2004 1st
11 62.0 4229 Oct-Nov 2004 2nd
12 63.4 4411 May-Jun 2005 1st
13 64.2 4414 Oct-Nov 2005 2nd
14 65.2 4506 Mar-Apr 2006 1st
15 66.1 4526 Sep-Oct 2006 2nd
16 67.2 4530 Apr-May 2007 1st
17 68.1 4565 Sep-Nov 2007 2nd
18 69.2 4744 Mar-May 2008 1st
19 70.1 4819 Oct-Nov 2008 2nd
20 71.3 4973 Jun-Jul 2009 1st
21 72.4 4994 Oct-Nov 2009 2nd
22 73.4 5234 May 2010 1st
23 74.2 5449 Nov-Dec 2010 2nd
24 75.3 5481 May 2011 1st
Table 2: Eurobarometer Data Coverage by Country
Old EU15: 1999-2011 (24 waves) New EU12: 2004-2011 (14 waves)
Code Name Code Name
AUT Austria BGR Bulgaria
BEL Belgium CYP Cyprus (Republic)
DNK Denmark CZE Czech Republic
FIN Finland EST Estonia
FRA France HUN Hungary
DEU Germany (East+West) LVA Latvia
GBR Great Britain LTU Lithuania
GRC Greece MLT Malta
IRL Ireland POL Poland
ITA Italy ROM Romania
LUX Luxembourg SVK Slovakia
NLD Netherlands SVN Slovenia
PRT Portugal
ESP Spain
SWE Sweden
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Table 3: Trust in the ECB by Socio-Demographic Category – Summary Statistics
Mean Std.Dev. Obs.
Full Sample 0.67 0.47 398,379
Gender
Male 0.69 0.46 194,238
Female 0.65 0.47 204,141
Age
15-24 0.70 0.46 51,199
25-44 0.67 0.47 137,345
45-64 0.66 0.47 133,504
65+ 0.65 0.48 76,288
Education
Up to 15 0.58 0.49 80,404
16-19 0.65 0.48 162,510
20+ 0.74 0.44 115,883
Still studying 0.74 0.44 35,219
Political Placement
Left 0.65 0.48 103,050
Center 0.68 0.46 136,544
Right 0.73 0.44 93,205
Economic Expectations
Better 0.78 0.42 78,731
Same 0.70 0.46 134,307
Worse 0.57 0.49 127,108
Income
Q1 0.62 0.48 17,878
Q2 0.66 0.47 20,755
Q3 0.70 0.46 20,415
Q4 0.74 0.44 21,961
Occupation
Unemployed 0.56 0.50 25,297
Retired 0.65 0.48 101,065
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Eurobarometer survey data.
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Table 4: Trust in the ECB, %, by Country Subgroup – Descriptive Statistics
EB52.0 Oct-Nov, 1999 EB61.0 Feb-Mar, 2004
Old EU15 Old EU15
Mean 66.14 68.44
Median 64.00 67.13
Maximum 88.93 81.69
Minimum 39.50 47.09
Std. Dev. 12.20 9.78
Skewness -0.14 -0.62
Kurtosis 3.05 2.63
Jarque-Bera 0.05 1.04
Probability 0.97 0.59
Observations 15 15
EB62.0 Oct-Nov 2004
All EU27 Old EU15 New EU12
Mean 73.89 71.93 76.33
Median 73.23 71.91 76.08
Maximum 92.82 84.14 92.82
Minimum 56.23 56.23 64.59
Std. Dev. 8.34 7.99 8.43
Skewness 0.02 -0.36 0.33
Kurtosis 2.74 2.28 2.35
Jarque-Bera 0.08 0.64 0.44
Probability 0.96 0.73 0.81
Observations 27 15 12
EB75.3 May 2011
All EU27 Old EU15 New EU12
Mean 57.81 55.14 61.14
Median 59.61 55.31 63.20
Maximum 77.54 77.54 72.06
Minimum 25.36 25.36 44.29
Std. Dev. 12.97 15.53 8.27
Skewness -0.72 -0.32 -0.67
Kurtosis 2.98 2.19 2.54
Jarque-Bera 2.33 0.68 1.02
Probability 0.31 0.71 0.60
Observations 27 15 12
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Eurobarometer survey data.
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Table 5: Baseline Logistic Regressions – Old EU15
Regressors 1999-2004 1999-2011
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Inflation(t) -0.009** -0.006 0.004** 0.004*
(0.004) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002)
Gender Dummy -0.030*** -0.030*** -0.038*** -0.040***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Age (BL: 15-24)
25-44 0.003 0.003 0.008 0.010*
(0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006)
45-64 0.014* 0.011 0.022*** 0.026***
(0.008) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005)
65+ 0.011 0.014 0.033*** 0.040***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007)
Education (BL: Up to 15)
16-19 0.016*** 0.005 0.026*** 0.029***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
20+ 0.049*** 0.033*** 0.068*** 0.071***
(0.007) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008)
Still studying 0.029*** 0.028*** 0.041*** 0.040***
(0.007) (0.008) (0.005) (0.005)
Political Placement (BL: Left)
Centre 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.022*** 0.022***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
Right 0.036*** 0.034*** 0.037*** 0.037***
(0.011) (0.013) (0.008) (0.008)
Occupation Dummies
Unemployed -0.039*** -0.023*** -0.037*** -0.037***
(0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Retired -0.006 0.007 -0.010* -0.011*
(0.007) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
Income (BL: Q1)
Q2 0.022***
(0.006)
Q3 0.041***
(0.006)
Q4 0.067***
(0.008)
Economic Expectations (BL: Same)
Better 0.021***
(0.004)
Worse -0.038***
(0.005)
Other Dummies and Interactions
Trust in EU Commission 0.401*** 0.402*** 0.401*** 0.392***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Hyperinflation -0.038*** -0.053*** -0.106*** -0.095***
(0.011) (0.009) (0.005) (0.006)
EMU 0.037*** 0.035*** 0.000 0.024***
(0.009) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007)
EU6 -0.094*** -0.089*** -0.115*** -0.119***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.003) (0.004)
SGPDEF -0.020*** -0.012 -0.010 -0.006
(0.007) (0.014) (0.007) (0.008)
SGPDEBT -0.009 -0.017 -0.035*** -0.036***
(0.011) (0.017) (0.011) (0.013)
IT/Float Countries 0.028*** 0.034*** -0.018** -0.016*
(0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009)
Peg Countries 0.065*** 0.065*** -0.028*** -0.010
(0.011) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009)
Hyperinflation x SGPDEBT 0.021* 0.023* -0.003 -0.011
(0.013) (0.014) (0.010) (0.010)
Observations 99,578 66,701 229,197 188,644
Adjusted Pseudo R-Sq 0.33 0.33 0.35 0.35
Notes: Average marginal effects are reported. Standard errors clustered by country are in
parentheses. All specifications are estimated using country and time fixed effects.
BL: Baseline; * p < :1, ** p < :05, *** p < :01:
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Table 6: Baseline Logistic Regressions – New EU12 and All EU27
2004-2011 1999-2011
Regressors New EU12 All EU27 All EU27
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Inflation(t) -0.000 -0.000 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Gender Dummy -0.012*** -0.033*** -0.032*** -0.032***
(0.003) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
Age (BL: 15-24)
25-44 0.002 0.011*** 0.007 0.008**
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
45-64 0.001 0.022*** 0.016*** 0.020***
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
65+ 0.000 0.033*** 0.024*** 0.029***
(0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006)
Education (BL: Up to 15)
16-19 0.015*** 0.027*** 0.023*** 0.025***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
20+ 0.035*** 0.063*** 0.060*** 0.061***
(0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007)
Still studying 0.023*** 0.037*** 0.037*** 0.035***
(0.007) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
Political Placement (BL: Left)
Centre 0.015** 0.019*** 0.021*** 0.021***
(0.007) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
Right 0.023** 0.035*** 0.037*** 0.036***
(0.010) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006)
Occupation Dummies
Unemployed -0.013** -0.025*** -0.030*** -0.029***
(0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005)
Retired -0.006 -0.009** -0.010** -0.010**
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Economic Expectations (BL: Same)
Better 0.031*** 0.026*** 0.025***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Worse -0.035*** -0.035*** -0.037***
(0.005) (0.003) (0.004)
Other Dummies and Interactions
Trust in EU Commission 0.363*** 0.387*** 0.398*** 0.389***
(0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Hyperinflation 0.005 0.020* 0.014 0.018
(0.010) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012)
EMU 0.029*** 0.038*** 0.031*** 0.035***
(0.008) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012)
EU6 -0.120*** -0.112*** -0.115***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
EU2004 -0.048** -0.045*** -0.044***
(0.021) (0.014) (0.015)
SGPDEF -0.006 -0.005 -0.014*** -0.009*
(0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006)
SGPDEBT 0.014*** -0.035* -0.032*** -0.033***
(0.001) (0.019) (0.011) (0.012)
IT/Float Countries -0.002 -0.015 -0.016* -0.018*
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Peg Countries 0.020** 0.008 -0.009 0.001
(0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010)
Hyperinflation x SGPDEBT -0.014* 0.037** 0.001 0.002
(0.008) (0.017) (0.011) (0.014)
Hyperinflation x EU15 -0.164*** -0.114*** -0.117***
(0.019) (0.014) (0.015)
Observations 77,748 223,100 309,461 266,392
Adjusted Pseudo R-Sq 0.45 0.39 0.37 0.38
Notes: Average marginal effects are reported. Standard errors clustered by country are in
parentheses. All specifications are estimated using country and time fixed effects.
BL: Baseline; * p < :1, ** p < :05, *** p < :01:
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Table 7: Robustness Checks – Non-EMU Subsample, Difference with Euro-Area Inflation
in Place of Actual Inflation
Regressors 1999-2004 2004-2011 1999-2011
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Difference with EMU inflation (t) -0.006 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001
(0.009) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Gender Dummy -0.050*** -0.028*** -0.034*** -0.031***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008)
Age (BL: 15-24)
25-44 -0.010 0.012 0.003 0.008
(0.014) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007)
45-64 0.001 0.015 0.006 0.012
(0.013) (0.010) (0.008) (0.008)
65+ -0.005 0.022* 0.011 0.017*
(0.018) (0.012) (0.010) (0.010)
Education (BL: Up to 15)
16-19 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.023*** 0.022***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.006)
20+ 0.057*** 0.047*** 0.051*** 0.050***
(0.005) (0.014) (0.010) (0.012)
Still studying 0.027*** 0.038*** 0.036*** 0.038***
(0.009) (0.013) (0.008) (0.009)
Political Placement (BL: Left)
Centre 0.033** 0.023*** 0.026*** 0.025**
(0.015) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010)
Right 0.066** 0.036*** 0.045*** 0.042***
(0.026) (0.013) (0.015) (0.014)
Occupation Dummies
Unemployed -0.040*** -0.021*** -0.026*** -0.023***
(0.010) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005)
Retired -0.016 -0.015*** -0.015** -0.015**
(0.016) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006)
Economic Expectations (BL: Same)
Better 0.025*** 0.029***
(0.005) (0.005)
Worse -0.031*** -0.031***
(0.004) (0.004)
Other Dummies and Interactions
Trust in EU Commission 0.413*** 0.375*** 0.393*** 0.381***
(0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Hyperinflation -0.226** 0.002 -0.006 0.001
(0.112) (0.011) (0.008) (0.009)
EU2004 0.214 -0.110*** -0.098*** -0.098***
(0.163) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013)
SGPDEF -0.235*** -0.003 -0.014* -0.008
(0.077) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
SGPDEBT 0.018 -0.019** -0.019* -0.027***
(0.045) (0.008) (0.011) (0.009)
IT/Float Countries 0.154** 0.009 0.019* 0.013
(0.076) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010)
Peg Countries 0.050** 0.027** 0.023** 0.028**
(0.023) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012)
Hyperinflation x SGPDEBT 0.023*** 0.014 0.026***
(0.006) (0.009) (0.007)
Observations 27,431 85,812 115,841 104,690
Adjusted Pseudo R-Sq 0.36 0.42 0.41 0.41
Notes: Average marginal effects are reported. Standard errors clustered by country are in
parentheses. All specifications are estimated using country and time fixed effects.
BL: Baseline; * p < :1, ** p < :05, *** p < :01:
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Table 8: Robustness Checks – EMU Subsample, Expected Inflation in Place of Actual
Inflation
Regressors 1999-2004 2004-2011 1999-2011
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Expected inflation (at t) -0.039 0.010 0.008 0.012*
(0.038) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Gender Dummy -0.021*** -0.035*** -0.030*** -0.031***
(0.005) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006)
Age (BL: 15-24)
25-44 0.008 0.010** 0.008 0.008
(0.007) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
45-64 0.019** 0.028*** 0.022*** 0.025***
(0.008) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
65+ 0.015 0.046*** 0.031*** 0.036***
(0.010) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007)
Education (BL: Up to 15)
16-19 0.014*** 0.031*** 0.025*** 0.027***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
20+ 0.046*** 0.078*** 0.067*** 0.069***
(0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.009)
Still studying 0.031*** 0.039*** 0.038*** 0.034***
(0.008) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
Political Placement (BL: Left)
Centre 0.020*** 0.015*** 0.018*** 0.017***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
Right 0.025*** 0.030*** 0.030*** 0.030***
(0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005)
Occupation Dummies
Unemployed -0.033*** -0.031*** -0.033*** -0.033***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008)
Retired 0.002 -0.008 -0.004 -0.005
(0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005)
Economic Expectations (BL: Same)
Better 0.024*** 0.022***
(0.005) (0.004)
Worse -0.037*** -0.041***
(0.006) (0.005)
Other Dummies and Interactions
Trust in EU Commission 0.393*** 0.396*** 0.400*** 0.393***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005)
Hyperinflation -0.051*** -0.029*** -0.028*** -0.031***
(0.009) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008)
EU6 -0.094*** -0.124*** -0.115*** -0.119***
(0.005) (0.008) (0.004) (0.005)
EU2004 -0.039 -0.017 -0.019
(0.030) (0.016) (0.019)
SGPDEF -0.016** -0.006 -0.013* -0.009
(0.008) (0.013) (0.008) (0.009)
SGPDEBT -0.005 -0.041 -0.027** -0.030**
(0.012) (0.029) (0.012) (0.015)
Hyperinflation x SGPDEBT 0.020 0.003 -0.005
(0.013) (0.011) (0.011)
Observations 77,662 113,571 193,620 161,702
Adjusted Pseudo R-Sq 0.32 0.37 0.35 0.36
Notes: Average marginal effects are reported. Standard errors clustered by country are in
parentheses. All specifications are estimated using country and time fixed effects.
BL: Baseline; * p < :1, ** p < :05, *** p < :01:
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Table 9: Robustness Checks – All EU27, National Inflation for Non-EMU EU Countries
but Euro-Area Inflation for EMU Countries in Place of Actual Inflation
Regressors 1999-2004 2004-2011 1999-2011
(1) (2) (3) (4)
National (if non-EMU member) or Euro- -0.017 -0.000 0.000 -0.000
Area (if EMU member) inflation (t) (0.011) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Gender Dummy -0.029*** -0.032*** -0.032*** -0.032***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
Age (BL: 15-24)
25-44 0.004 0.011** 0.006 0.008*
(0.007) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
45-64 0.014** 0.022*** 0.016*** 0.020***
(0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
65+ 0.011 0.035*** 0.024*** 0.029***
(0.009) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006)
Education (BL: Up to 15)
16-19 0.016*** 0.027*** 0.023*** 0.025***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
20+ 0.049*** 0.064*** 0.060*** 0.061***
(0.006) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007)
Still studying 0.029*** 0.039*** 0.037*** 0.035***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004)
Political Placement (BL: Left)
Centre 0.024*** 0.019*** 0.021*** 0.021***
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Right 0.037*** 0.034*** 0.037*** 0.036***
(0.010) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006)
Occupation Dummies
Unemployed -0.035*** -0.026*** -0.030*** -0.029***
(0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005)
Retired -0.004 -0.012*** -0.010** -0.010**
(0.007) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Economic Expectations (BL: Same)
Better 0.025*** 0.025***
(0.003) (0.003)
Worse -0.034*** -0.037***
(0.004) (0.004)
Other Dummies and Interactions
Trust in EU Commission 0.399*** 0.388*** 0.398*** 0.389***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Hyperinflation -0.053 0.017 0.018* 0.021*
(0.040) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012)
EMU 0.017 0.039*** 0.031*** 0.035***
(0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012)
EU6 -0.095*** -0.120*** -0.112*** -0.115***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
EU2004 0.066 -0.051** -0.043*** -0.043***
(0.056) (0.024) (0.013) (0.015)
SGPDEF -0.019*** -0.004 -0.014*** -0.010*
(0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.006)
SGPDEBT -0.013 -0.036 -0.032*** -0.033***
(0.009) (0.023) (0.011) (0.012)
IT/Float Countries 0.247*** -0.015 -0.016* -0.018*
(0.088) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Peg Countries 0.075*** 0.009 -0.006 0.003
(0.026) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010)
Hyperinflation x SGPDEBT 0.022* 0.043** 0.002 0.002
(0.013) (0.020) (0.011) (0.014)
Observations 105,093 199,383 309,461 266,392
Adjusted Pseudo R-Sq 0.34 0.39 0.37 0.38
Notes: Average marginal effects are reported. Standard errors clustered by country are in
parentheses. All specifications are estimated using country and time fixed effects.
BL: Baseline; * p < :1, ** p < :05, *** p < :01:
32 Farvaque, Hayat and Mihailov (Revised: October 2012)
Table 10: Evolution of Trust in the ECB after the Financial Crisis – All EU27
2007-2011
Regressors Old EU15 New EU12 All EU27
(1) (2) (3)
Inflation(t) 0.003 0.002 0.000
(0.005) (0.001) (0.002)
Gender Dummy -0.044*** -0.012*** -0.033***
(0.008) (0.003) (0.006)
Age (BL: 15-24)
25-44 0.018** 0.005 0.013**
(0.008) (0.006) (0.005)
45-64 0.035*** -0.001 0.021***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.006)
65+ 0.060*** 0.003 0.038***
(0.010) (0.012) (0.009)
Education (BL: Up to 15)
16-19 0.034*** 0.010*** 0.025***
(0.007) (0.004) (0.005)
20+ 0.085*** 0.030*** 0.065***
(0.012) (0.006) (0.010)
Still studying 0.047*** 0.028*** 0.040***
(0.010) (0.009) (0.007)
Political Placement (BL: Left)
Centre 0.019*** 0.012* 0.018***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005)
Right 0.038*** 0.027*** 0.037***
(0.007) (0.008) (0.006)
Occupation Dummies
Unemployed -0.037*** -0.011* -0.026***
(0.010) (0.006) (0.007)
Retired -0.018*** -0.008 -0.014***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.005)
Economic Expectations (BL: Same)
Better 0.022*** 0.023*** 0.023***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004)
Worse -0.029*** -0.029*** -0.029***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.005)
Other Dummies and Interactions
Trust in EU Commission 0.393*** 0.373*** 0.393***
(0.006) (0.004) (0.002)
Hyperinflation -0.140*** -0.034*** -0.009
(0.011) (0.011) (0.017)
EMU 0.068** 0.007 0.026
(0.033) (0.011) (0.016)
EU6 -0.117*** -0.119***
(0.007) (0.005)
EU2004 -0.065**
(0.026)
SGPDEF -0.018 0.014 -0.007
(0.018) (0.009) (0.013)
SGPDEBT -0.047* -0.004 -0.049*
(0.026) (0.003) (0.027)
IT/Float Countries -0.012 -0.011 -0.015
(0.014) (0.008) (0.010)
Peg Countries 0.024 0.003 0.008
(0.016) (0.008) (0.011)
Hyperinflation x SGPDEBT -0.033*** 0.009
(0.004) (0.027)
Hyperinflation x EU15 -0.141***
(0.031)
Observations 79,346 45,962 125,308
Adjusted Pseudo R-Sq 0.37 0.46 0.40
Notes: Average marginal effects are reported. Standard errors clustered by country are in
parentheses. All specifications are estimated using country and time fixed effects.
 Second wave of 2007.
BL: Baseline; * p < :1, ** p < :05, *** p < :01:
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